Peer-Produced Privacy Violations

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19 September 2008

outline

- definitions

- social motivations

- social risk assessment

- social harms

- three questionable "solutions"

1
social network sites

definition (boyd/Ellison)

1. profiles

2. links

3. social graph

examples

- Friendster

- Facebook

- MySpace

- [YouTube, Flickr, &c.]

2
social motivations

identity

- impression management

- Fakesters

- groups, wall posts, &c.

relationship

- make new friends
  - associate with curent ones
  - reconnect with old ones
- exchange gifts, wall posts, &c.

community

- social *networks*

- visualization

- conspicuous friending

3
social risk evaluation

misleading heuristics

- The water's fine; come on in

- Safety in numbers

- I think we're alone now

- Nobody in here but us chickens

- You know me, old buddy, old pal

- I know how much this means to you

- Cut it out! Do you think I can't see you?

facebook is a privacy virus

4
social privacy harms

disclosure

- deans

- police

- employers

- stalkers

- etc.

surveillance

- it's also creepy just to be watched

- News Feed = real-time mass surveillance

instability

- Facebook profiles weren't searchable . . .

  - . . . until they were

- Beacon leaked information in a way that users couldn't have anticipated

- bugs, breaches, leaks, &c.

disagreement

- I want to be your Facebook friend

  - what if you don't want to be mine?

- I upload a photo of you

  - what if you don't want it online?

spillovers

- inference on social network graphs

- networks naturally grow

  - Facebook used to be Harvard-only

  - then college-only

  - &c.

denigration

- other users disrupt your self-presentation
  - graffiti on your Wall
  - when worlds collide
- Beacon hijacks profiles for endorsements

5
"solutions"

privacy policies?

- readership low

- comprehension lower

- "Therefore, we cannot and do not guarantee that User Content you post on the Site will not be viewed by unauthorized persons."

technical controls?

- facebook's controls are outstanding

    - but people don't use them

- technical rules don't solve social problems

    - ambiguous relationsips

    - friends you can't trust

data ownership?

- yes, you could take "your" data with you
  - but it's your contacts' data, too
- interoperability creates security holes
  - and a privacy race to the bottom

questions?

for the full treatment:
"Facebook and the Social Dynamics of Privacy" (draft)